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We examine the impact of different degrees of fiscal feedback on debt in 
an economy with nominal rigidities where monetary policy is optimal. We look 
at the extent to which different degrees of fiscal feedback enhances or detracts 
from the ability of the monetary authorities to stabilise output and inflation. 
Using an objective function derived from utility, we find the optimal level of 
fiscal feedback to be small. There is a clear discontinuity in the behaviour of 
monetary policy and welfare either side of this optimal level. As the extent of 
fiscal feedback increases, optimal monetary policy becomes less active because 
fiscal feedback tends to deflate inflationary shocks. However this fiscal 
stabilisation is less efficient than monetary policy, and so welfare declines. In 
contrast, if fiscal feedback falls below some critical value, either the model 
becomes indeterminate, or optimal monetary policy becomes strongly passive, 
and this passive monetary policy leads to a sharp deterioration in welfare. 
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With the occasional and notable exception, most governments now see one of their primary economic
responsibilities as ensuring that the national debt stays within reasonable bounds. In some cases
explicit targets for the debt to GDP ratio have been announced, with the implication that if debt
deviates from this target, some form of ‘ﬁscal feedback’ via taxes or spending will operate. How-
ever it is also recognized that any attempt to control the debt stock, or the public sector deﬁcit, too
tightly may induce instability in other macroeconomic variables. There is a trade-oﬀ between ensur-
ing intergenerational equity through ﬁscal responsibility and the goal of short term macroeconomic
stabilisation.
In this paper we examine this trade-oﬀ. Recently some studies (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
and Benigno and Woodford (2004) in particular) have looked at jointly optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policies. While examining jointly optimal policy is of interest, and we compute such policies, it appears
unrealistic given current institutional arrangements. It is generally the case that ﬁscal policy is far
less ﬂexible than monetary policy. Partly as a result, the focus of policy makers seems to be on how
quickly any debt disequilibrium should be corrected, as the debates around the Stability and Growth
Pact of the European Monetary Union illustrate.1
We assume that this ‘ﬁscal feedback’ from debt takes a very simple form, such that spending
is adjusted by some ﬁxed proportion of debt disequilibrium, and we examine the implications of
alternative values for this feedback parameter. We compare this simple ﬁscal feedback to a fully
optimal ﬁscal policy, where spending can also adjust directly to shocks. Our use of spending rather
than taxes as the means of debt control allows us to abstract from issues of tax smoothing. We look
at a closed economy, where monetary policy is determined optimally, assuming commitment. We
compute welfare using an objective function derived from consumer utility.
Traditionally it was thought that some minimum level of ﬁscal feedback was required for a stable
and determinate economy. However, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level literature has argued that a
determinate equilibrium may be possible when no feedback occurs, but where prices adjust to ensure
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint holds. (See Woodford (1996), but also Buiter (2002)
for a more critical view.) However there have been few studies that have explicitly compared welfare
under such a regime to a more conventional regime where suﬃcient ﬁscal feedback occurs. In this
paper we make such a comparison, and ﬁnd that determinate regimes involving little or no ﬁscal
feedback are always welfare dominated by regimes with stronger ﬁscal feedback, essentially because
1This does not imply ﬁscal policy makers are ‘irrational’, but may simply reﬂect overriding political economy concerns
that are outside the scope of this paper.
1optimal monetary policy in regimes with little or no ﬁscal feedback is strongly ‘passive’ (in the sense
of Leeper (1991)). We show that, in conventional regimes where suﬃcient ﬁscal feedback occurs to
allow an active monetary policy, then the optimal amount of ﬁscal feedback is modest. This optimal
degree of ﬁscal feedback leaves debt following a stochastic process close to (but not exactly equal to)
a random walk. We also show that, in between these two regimes, there are values of ﬁscal feedback
which leave the economy indeterminate.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines our core model, which embodies nominal
rigidity through Calvo contracts, and where consumers are ‘inﬁnitely lived’.We discuss the solution
method in Section 3 and examine the implications of the model for both the optimal degree of ﬁscal
feedback, and for fully optimal ﬁscal policy in Section 4. Section 5 outlines a variant to our model,
where consumers are of the Blanchard Yaari type. Although we ﬁnd that our results are not changed
signiﬁcantly in a quantitative way, we do note some important qualitative diﬀerences to fully optimal
ﬁscal policy in particular. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is of a closed economy, with government, where government spending involves producing
public goods that are valued by consumers. Consumers also value private consumption and leisure
and are inﬁnitely lived. Firms set prices subject to Calvo contracts. Monetary policy is determined
optimally under commitment to maximise a social welfare function derived from consumer’s utility.
Around the steady state the ﬁscal authority varies government spending in proportion to debt dise-
quilibrium, although this ‘ﬁscal feedback’ may be zero.
2.1 Consumers
Our model of the household sector is familiar from Woodford (2003). Our economy is inhabited by a
large number of individuals, who specialize in the production of a diﬀerentiated good (indexed by z),
and who spend h(z) of eﬀort in its production. They consume a basket of goods C, and derive utility







βv−t [u(Cv) + f(Gv) − v(hv(z))]. (1)
The price of a diﬀerentiated good z is denoted by p(z), and the aggregate price level is P.2 An
individual chooses optimal consumption and work eﬀort to maximise criterion (1) subject to the
2Adding taste shocks along the lines of Woodford (2003) would have no material impact on our results.
2demand system and the intertemporal budget constraint:
PtCt + Et (Qt,t+1At+1) ≤ At + (1 − τ)(wt(z)ht(z) + Πt(z)) + Tt, (2)
where PtCt =
￿ 1
0 p(z)c(z)dz is nominal consumption, At are nominal ﬁnancial assets of a household,
Πt is proﬁt and Tt is a lump-sum subsidy. Here w is the wage rate, and τ is a tax rate on income.
Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor which determines the price in period t to the individual of
being able to carry a state-contingent amount At+1 of wealth into period t+1. The riskless short term





Each individual consumes the same basket of goods. Goods are aggregated into a Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) consumption index with the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods given by ￿t > 1









We assume no Ponzi schemes and that the net present value of individual’s future income is
bounded. We also assume that the nominal interest rate is positive at all times. These assumptions
rule out inﬁnite consumption and allow us to replace the inﬁnite sequence of ﬂow budget constraints




Qt,vCvPv ≤ At + Et
∞ ￿
v=t
Qt,v {(1 − τ)(wv(z)hv(z) + Πv(z))) + Tv}. (3)
The optimisation requires that the household exhaust its intertemporal budget constraint and, in
addition, the household’s wealth accumulation must satisfy the transversality condition
lim
s→∞Et (Qt,sAs) = 0. (4)

















where parameter σ is deﬁned as σ = −uC(C)/uCC(C)C. Additionally, aggregate (nominal) asset
accumulation is given by
At+1 = (1 + it)(At + (1 − τ)PtYt − PtCt) (6)
3We make this parameter stochastic to allow us to generate shocks to the mark-up of ﬁrms.
4We do not need to assume this speciﬁc functional forn of utility for our results in this section, but it is required when
we introduce Blanchard-Yaari consumers.
3We deﬁne At = At/Pt−1 and linearise equations (5) and (6) around the steady state (for each
variable Xt with steady state value X, we use the notation ˆ Xt = ln(Xt/X)). Equation (5) leads to
the following Euler equation (intertemporal IS curve):
ˆ Ct = Et ˆ Ct+1 − σ(ˆ ıt − Etˆ πt+1) (7)
Inﬂation is πt = Pt
Pt−1 − 1 and we assume inﬂation is zero in equilibrium.
The assets equation can be linearised as













Here ρ = C/Y is the steady state share of private consumption in Y and A is the steady state level
of real assets as a share of Y .
2.2 Price Setting
Price setting is based on Calvo contracting as set out in Woodford (2003). Each period agents re-
calculate their prices with ﬁxed probability 1 − γ. If prices are not recalculated (with probability γ),
they remain ﬁxed. Following Woodford (2003) and allowing for government consumption terms in the
utility function, we can derive the following Phillips curve for our economy5:
ˆ πt = βEtˆ πt+1 + κc ˆ Ct + κy ˆ Yt + ˆ µt (8)
where the shock ˆ µt is a mark-up shock . Although the constant income tax τ has no eﬀect on the
dynamic equations for log-deviations from the ﬂexible price equilibrium, it alters the equilibrium choice
between consumption and leisure for the consumer. The coeﬃcients of the Phillips curve are:
κc =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)ψ
γ (ψ + ￿)σ
, κy =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
γ (ψ + ￿)
.
where ψ = vy/vyyy.
Under ﬂexible prices and in the steady state the real wage is always equal to the monopolistic
mark-up µt = −(1 − ￿t)/￿t. Optimisation by consumers then implies (we assume the production
function yt = ht) :








where µw is a steady state employment subsidy, which we discuss below.
5The derivation is identical to the one in Woodford (2003), amended by the introduction of mark-up shocks as in
Beetsma and Jensen (2004a).
42.3 Fiscal Authorities
The government buys goods (G), taxes income (with tax rate τ), and issues nominal debt B. The
evolution of the nominal debt stock can be written as:
Bt+1 = (1 + it)(Bt + PtGt − τPtYt)
We assume that the tax rate on income is ﬁxed. This equation can be linearised as (deﬁning Bt =
Bt/Pt−1 and denoting the steady state ratio of debt to output as B) :













We postulate that disequilibrium in government spending is related to debt disequilibrium according
to the following simple feedback rule:
ˆ Gt = −λ ˆ Bt (11)
Our reason for adopting a simple mechanistic rule for ﬁscal policy is that it more accurately reﬂects
institutional rigidities in policymaking. Of course there are a variety of potential simple rules, but
rule (11) focuses directly on the concern with debt disequilibrium, and has been widely used in the
literature. We also compute fully optimal ﬁscal policies, such that monetary and ﬁscal policy are
jointly determined in an optimal manner under commitment, along lines discussed below. We show
below that, in the context of the particular model we use and with a fully optimal monetary policy,
the loss in welfare generated by adopting rule (11) rather than a fully optimal policy is small.6
Government expenditures constitute part of demand
Yt = Ct + Gt (12)
and in steady state G = (1 − ρ)Y. The linearised aggregate demand equation is then:
ˆ Yt = (1 − ρ) ˆ Gt + ρ ˆ Ct. (13)
2.4 Behaviour of the Economy
We now write down the ﬁnal system of equations for the ‘law of motion’ of the out-of-steady-state
economy. We simplify notation by using lower case letters to denote ‘gap’ variables, where the gap is
6If monetray policy is constrained or absent, as in the case of a monetary union member facing asymmetric shocks
for example, then ﬁscal policy may well have a useful role to play in stabilisation: see Kirsanova, Satchi, Vines, and
Wren-Lewis (2007) for example.
5the diﬀerence between actual levels and natural levels i.e. xt = ˆ Xt − ˆ Xn
t . We omit the expectational
superscript, assuming rational expectations, EtXt+1 = Xt+1 for any variable X.
ct = ct+1 − σ(it − πt+1) (14)
πt = βπt+1 + κcct + κyyt + ˆ µt (15)
yt = (1 − ρ)gt + ρct (16)













gt = −λbt (18)
bt = at (19)
The model consists of an intertemporal IS curve (14), the Phillips curve (15), an aggregate demand
equation (16), and an equation explaining the evolution of assets (17). The ﬁscal feedback rule is
given by (18). We could use the debt accumulation equation (10) instead of (17) as they are equivalent
(equation (19)).
This system describes the dynamic behaviour of the economy as observed by a policymaker. Equa-
tions (14) and (15) describe the reaction function of the private sector. As we discussed above, the
private sector chooses consumption and inﬂation at each period in time, such that their future utility
and proﬁts are maximised, given the evolution of state variables and policy. The ﬁscal authorities
are a non-strategic player in this set-up, as they mechanically react to the level of domestic debt.
Therefore, the level of assets (debt), government expenditures and output are predetermined state
variables, and the interest rate is the policy variable.
2.5 Central Bank’s decisions


































where O(3) collects terms of higher than second order and terms independent of policy, and all ai
are positive. This quadratic approximation to social welfare is obtained assuming that there is a
production subsidy µw that eliminates the distortion caused by monopolistic competition and income
6taxes. (This follows Woodford (2003). Sutherland (2002) and Benigno and Woodford (2004) use an
alternative way of eliminating ﬁrst order terms from welfare, while Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
do not use a linear quadratic framework, but instead use a Ramsey approach.) We assume that the
central bank has suﬃcient credibility to commit to the time inconsistent plan — in other words it can
implement the ﬁrst best time inconsistent solution.
Note also that expression (21) contains a quadratic term in government spending, g. This term
enters the welfare expression partly because it is assumed in (1) that households derive utility from
consumption of public goods, and that the level of government spending in steady state reﬂects this.
However, if we instead assumed that consumers derived no utility from government spending, and
that government spending was pure waste, a quadratic term in g would still appear in social welfare
through the national income identity.
3 Model Solution
The central bank chooses the interest rate to minimise social loss (21) subject to the reaction of the
private sector (14), (15) and the evolution of predetermined state variables (17)-(19).





















s+1 (cs+1 − σ(is − πs+1) − cs)
+βs−tLπ









(1 − τ)(1 − ρ)λ
B
￿







In order to minimise the loss function, we diﬀerentiate the Lagrangian with respect to Lc, Lπ, Lb,
7π, c, b and i. The ﬁrst order conditions for optimality are:
∂w
∂πs


















































(1 − τ)(1 − ρ)λ
B
￿






along with initial conditions Lc
t = Lπ
t = 0,bt = ¯ b, see Currie and Levine (1993).7
We discuss the solution to this problem in detail in Appendix A. In particular, we note the rela-
tionship between the number of jump variables in the system and the size of the system’s eigenvalues,
which governs whether the system is stable, unstable or indeterminate. We show how the size of key
eigenvalues depends on the extent of ﬁscal feedback λ. These results are summarised in Section 4
below. In what follows, we also use the fact that the solution for the optimal interest rate rule can be
presented in the form of linear relationship (see Appendix B):
it = θµˆ µ + θbbt + ϑLπLπ
t + ϑLcLc
t (29)
with feedback coeﬃcients θ on predetermined states and with feedback coeﬃcients ϑ on predetermined
Lagrange multipliers.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy and Welfare
Our focus of interest is in exploring the implications of diﬀerent values of the ﬁscal feedback parameter
λ. We are interested in two key questions. First, can we distinguish clearly between two policy
‘regimes’, as suggested by the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level and the results in Leeper (1991) and
7In all the analysis below we take ¯ b = 0 i.e we assume we start from a position in which debt is at its steady state.
8Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000)? If we can, how does welfare and optimal monetary policy compare
between regimes? Second, what is the optimal degree of ﬁscal feedback on debt, and what are the
implications for welfare and monetary policy of departing from this optimum?
The calibration of the model is discussed in Appendix C. Figure 1 presents the values of some key
magnitudes as we change the degree of ﬁscal feedback λ. The left and right panels are identical except
for the scale of λ: the left hand side focuses on small values of ﬁscal feedback above zero, whereas the
right hand panel gives results for a much broader range. The bottom charts plot the loss that results
from a 1% cost push shock expressed as percent reduction in steady-state consumption. The charts
above plot parameters θ from the implied reaction function for monetary policy (29): i.e. the feedback
coeﬃcient on the mark-up shock, θµ (top panel), and on debt, θb.8.
4.1 The two policy regimes
Figure 1 and the analysis in Appendix A suggest that there are two determinate regimes, in each of
which all processes are either stationary or unit root. We discuss each of these two regimes ﬁrst, and
then consider the ‘gap’ between them.
The ﬁrst regime occurs when λ = 0. Here we have no feedback from debt disequilibrium to ﬁscal
variables, so we might suppose that debt in this model would be unstable. However, the results show
that monetary policy is able to stabilise the system. Our system has four predetermined variables, and
we report in Appendix A that for λ = 0 the system has exactly four eigenvalues which are less than
or equal to one in absolute value, and all other eigenvalues are not smaller than 1/β. Monetary policy
achieves stability in two ways, both shown in Figure 1. First, any positive debt disequilibrium leads
to a large fall in interest rates, which leads to correction through the government’s budget constraint.
Second, the reaction to a positive cost-push shock is also to reduce interest rates. As a positive
cost-push shock also raises debt, this reduction in interest rates also helps achieve debt stability.
In contrast, in the second regime, where λ ≥ λ∗ (we discuss the value of λ∗ below), the reaction to
a cost-push shock is to raise interest rates. The system is again determinate: we report in Appendix A,
that for λ ≥ λ∗ the system has exactly four eigenvalues which are less than or equal to one in absolute
value, and all other eigenvalues are not smaller than 1/β. The diﬀerence in response to an inﬂationary
shock in the two regimes reﬂects the distinction between ‘active’ and ’passive’ regimes identiﬁed in
Leeper (1991) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), although their analysis only considered very simple
rules for monetary policy rather than optimal monetary policy. Leeper (1991) describes an active
8As formula 29 shows, there will also be feedback on predetermined Lagrange multipliers ϑL. We do not plot them
as they are less informative: ϑL represent the integral control part of the reaction function and therefore feedback on
slow moving variables.
9monetary policy regime as a coeﬃcient on inﬂation in a Taylor type rule for nominal interest rates
greater than unity (i.e. the ‘Taylor principle’ is satisﬁed). In Leeper (1991) and Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2000) active monetary policy is associated with non-negligible ﬁscal feedback.
In the area between these two points, 0 < λ < λ∗ the system has three eigenvalues which are
strictly inside the unit circle, two eigenvalues that are outside the unit circle but strictly less than
1/β, and all other eigenvalues are not smaller than 1/β (see Appendix A). Although the transversality
conditions imply that debt grows at less than the real rate of interest, and the total cost of such
dynamics will be ﬁnite (because of discounting), in this case there are more eigenvalues which are
less than 1/β in absolute value than the number of predetermined variables. As a result, there is a
continuum of such ‘moderately’ explosive solutions, so we cannot plot anything for 0 < λ < λ∗ in
Figure 1. At the boundaries of the region λ = 0 and λ = λ∗, the size of one of these unstable roots
falls to unity, and so we have a determinate system with random walk properties.
There is a clear parallel between our results using optimal monetary policy and the active and
passive regimes described by Leeper (1991) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000). 9 In their case a
passive monetary policy is deﬁned as a negative response of real interest rates when inﬂation is above
target in a Taylor rule, whereas in our case it corresponds to a fall in real interest rates following a
positive cost-push shock. When there is no ﬁscal feedback, ﬁscal instruments do nothing to prevent
a debt interest spiral. To avoid an explosive solution for debt, monetary rather than ﬁscal policy
must stabilise the government’s debt stock. Following a cost push shock, output will fall, lowering
tax receipts and raising debt. To avoid a debt interest spiral, real rates must also fall, so that the
governments intertemporal budget constraint continues to hold. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which
plots the impulse response for key economic variables for the two values of λ,λ = 0 as a dashed line,
and λ = λmin > λ∗ as a solid line, following a cost push shock, where λmin delivers the minimum loss.
Our ﬁnding of a region with a continuum of solutions for some (small) values of λ is also of interest.
In certain respect, such solutions share some properties of indeterminate solutions discussed in the
Real Business cycles literature. There, indeterminacy is a common feature of (rational expectations)
economies that exhibit some market imperfections. It typically arises in markets with external eﬀects
or with monopolistic competition. In our model we have a distortion generated by price rigidity, but
we have oﬀset monopolistic distortions with a subsidy. In our case multiplicity (which for convenience
we will refer to as indeterminacy) is clearly linked with the presence of government debt, and the
9The use of a Taylor rule to describe monetary policy allows Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) to calculate analytically
a critical value for λ that divides the two policy regimes from the determinate stability condition (which is a necessary
but not suﬃcient condition for a determinate or stable solution). They ﬁnd that this critical value of λ is small, in the
sense of being of the same order of magnitude as the steady state value of real interest rates, and we obtain a similar
result for λ
∗ as we note below.
10problem that uncontrolled debt poses for monetary policy. As our two determinate policy regimes
demonstrate, monetary policy has to behave in a very diﬀerent way if it is trying to control debt rather
than control inﬂation, and in between these two regimes the rational expectations private sector has a
continuum of responses consistent with the two diﬀerent incentives of the monetary authorities. Note
however that under any of these continuum of responses of the private sector, the economy exhibits
a ‘controlled explosion’, i.e. the rate of divergence is strictly less than the real rate of interest. The
monetary policy that tries to achieve two targets is unable to ensure the convergence of the economy
back to the steady state.
4.2 Optimal value of the ﬁscal feedback
A key result from Figure 1 is that the ‘passive’ regime is less successful at stabilising shocks than an
active policy, whatever the value of λ in the range λ ≥ λ∗. This is perhaps not surprising, but we
are not aware that this has been formally demonstrated in the literature before. While the papers
cited above, and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level more generally, have shown that a lack of ﬁscal
feedback does not necessary lead to model indeterminacy/instability, it is clear from our results that an
active monetary policy regime is superior at stabilising the economy, assuming that monetary policy
is optimal in both regimes.
Turning to the determinate regime where there is ﬁscal feedback (λ ≥ λ∗), the optimal value of λ
(which we denote as λmin) is very close to the lowest possible value that sustains this regime, λ∗(see
Table 1). As we noted above, at λ = λ∗, one of the system’s eigenvalues is exactly unity, and this
corresponds with a unit root process for debt At the optimal value of lambda (λ = λmin), therefore,
debt is almost a unit root process, but will eventually return to its original steady state value. This
is of particular interest in the light of results in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Benigno and
Woodford (2004), that suggest that a completely optimal ﬁscal policy would exhibit a pure ‘random
walk’ for debt. We can conﬁrm this result for our model: if we compute a fully optimal ﬁscal policy (so
that both monetary and ﬁscal policies determined cooperatively are optimal under commitment), debt
follows a exact random walk10. This is illustrated in Fig 4, where we plot the paths of government
spending and debt under a fully optimal ﬁscal policy, and in the case of λ = λmin.
The intuition behind the random walk result is as follows. Leaving debt permanently higher
has a welfare cost, which is that government spending must be permanently below the optimal level
implied by agents’ preferences for public goods, in order to ‘ﬁnance’ the additional debt. However
10One notable diﬀerence between our analysis and those in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Benigno and Woodford
(2004) is that we treat government spending, rather than taxes, as the ﬁscal policy instrument.
11with discounting this permanent cost is ﬁnite, and the departure from optimal government spending
is small. To return debt to its original steady state level quickly would require much larger cuts in
government spending in the short term. Although the intertemporal government budget constraint
roughly equates the monetary value of these alternative paths, the fact that welfare includes quadratic
terms in spending means that smooth paths tend to be preferred to others (as in tax smoothing, for
example), and so the random walk result is less costly than larger, short term adjustment. However,
note from Figure 4 that under fully optimal ﬁscal policy the debt implications of the shock are not
completely accommodated: there is an attempt in the ﬁrst period to reduce spending and thereby
moderate the eventual increase in debt. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) analytically conﬁrm that this
will always be the case, and discuss the reasons for it. This initial path for government spending
cannot be replicated under our simple feedback rule, because spending is tied to debt. Although this
short term diﬀerence is small in quantitative terms, it helps explain why the optimal level of ﬁscal
feedback (λ = λmin) is very slightly above that required for a pure random walk.
Table 1 also shows that the fully optimal ﬁscal policy, the ‘random walk’ level of ﬁscal feedback
(λ = λ∗) and the optimal level of ﬁscal feedback (λ = λmin) are all associated with an active monetary
policy, in the sense that interest rates rise following a cost-push shock (see also ﬁgures 1 and 3).11
The optimal value of ﬁscal feedback, although it does not produce a pure random walk, is extremely
close to a random walk. In Figure 4 we note that debt is substantially above its original level even
after 500 years. The value λ = λmin implies that for every $100 of debt disequilibrium, government
spending is reduced by $1.25 dollars a quarter. This value is close to the value of the steady state real
interest rate, as we would expect given the near random walk behaviour of debt. (It is not identical
to this level, because changes in government spending have implications for other variables including
labour supply and output, and this in turn inﬂuences tax receipts.) For λ > λmin, Figure 1 shows
that the loss function steadily increases, although even when adjustment becomes very large (a value
of λ = 1 implies that government spending falls by over $40 each quarter for every $100 in debt
disequilibrium), the loss is never as great as in the case of λ = 0. However, the increase in loss does
demonstrate the macroeconomic costs involved in attempting to correct debt disequilibrium quickly.12
11In this respect our results can be compared with those in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). Their approach does not
allow the identiﬁcation of a feedback rule for monetary policy, so instead they employ a regression technique to examine
the nature of optimal monetary policy. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) estimate a relationship between inﬂation and
interest rates, and they ﬁnd the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is negative. However, it is not clear that this indicates a passive
policy. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) also show that optimal policy involves an almost constant inﬂation rate, which
appears inconsistent with a passive monetary policy where inﬂation is used to correct the government’s ﬁscal position.
Our approach allows us to study this question in a direct way, by constructing an explicit policy reaction function.
12The costs of larger λ ‘come from’ the quadratic term in g in social welfare. If we artiﬁcially delete this term, the loss
function after λ
∗ would be ﬂat. However, as we note above, it would be illegitimate to delete this term in g, even if all
12While a policy that set λ a little above λmin would have little cost — and would also be prudent given
our indeterminacy ﬁndings — setting a much larger value for λ would incur signiﬁcant costs.
It is worth noting that increasing λ does have a noticeable impact on optimal monetary policy:
the response of real interest rates to the cost push shock falls substantially as λ increases. The reason
for this is as follows. For large λ, ﬁscal policy helps stabilise the impact of a cost push shock. The
shock raises debt (see above), which with large λ implies a substantial decline in government spending.
This deﬂates the economy, implying less of a need for real interest rates to rise. However, this form of
feedback is less eﬃcient at demand stabilisation than monetary policy, as the values for the welfare loss
show. Although both ﬁscal and monetary policy act directly on demand (through public and private
consumption respectively), ﬁscal policy only acts when debt changes, whereas optimal monetary policy
can respond directly to inﬂationary shocks, and is therefore more eﬃcient.
One ﬁnal comparison of interest is to compare welfare under a fully optimal ﬁscal policy with welfare
when ﬁscal feedback is optimal. We argued above that, given current institutional arrangements, ﬁscal
feedback represents a more realistic view of ﬁscal policy setting than a fully optimal ﬁscal policy, but
it is interesting to note what the costs of this are. Table 1 compares losses for simple ﬁscal feedback
and a ﬁscal policy that is fully optimal i.e. like monetary policy, it responds directly to the cost push
shock as well as debt. Losses under the optimal level of debt feedback are only slightly above those
under a fully optimal ﬁscal policy. In this case, therefore, there is only a small cost in restricting ﬁscal
policy to just respond to debt.
5 Blanchard-Yaari consumers
The results discussed so far assume that consumers are inﬁnitely lived, so changes in government
debt/personal wealth have no direct eﬀect on the pattern of consumer spending over time. In this
section we examine an alternative set up, where consumers have ﬁnite lives, using the framework due
to Blanchard and Yaari (Blanchard (1985)). (Blanchard/Yaari consumers are also modelled in Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2007) who examine issues of stability and monetary/ﬁscal policy interaction in a
monetary union, as well as Smets and Wouters (2002) and Ganelli (2005)). With Blanchard/Yaari
consumers, we now have a direct route whereby changes in government debt will inﬂuence changes in
consumption, and we want to examine the extent to which the results described above continue to
hold. Introducing Blanchard/Yaari consumers does, however, introduce costs in terms of complexity,
which is why we do not examine them in the base case. We brieﬂy outline changes to the model and
government spending was pure waste.
13the welfare metric in this section, and give all details in an Additional Appendix13.
5.1 The model
We need to make a number of changes to our model, described by equations (14)— (19). First,
as consumers have a constant probability of death, p, the discount factor in formula (1) becomes
β/(1+p). Second, in the household budget constraint (2), the discount factor takes account of mortality,
Et(Qt,t+1) = 1
(1+it)(1+p). Third, these modiﬁcations and the fact that we now have an inﬁnite number
of living cohorts at each moment of time, results in a new system for aggregate variables. The ﬁrst
order conditions for individual consumption, and then aggregation of all such behavioural equations,
leads to a pair of equations for aggregate consumption and for the average propensity to consume,
instead of the single Euler equation (7):
ˆ Ct = [β(1 + i)]−σ(Et ˆ Ct+1 +
pρ
Φθ
(Et ˆ At+1 − Etˆ πt+1 − Etˆ Φt+1)) − σ(ˆ ıt − Etˆ πt+1), (30)
(1 + p)(1 + i)
βσ(1 + i)σ
ˆ Φt = Etˆ Φt+1 − (1 − σ)(ˆ ıt − Etˆ πt+1), (31)
where 1/Φt is average propensity to consume out of total resources, resources which consist of nominal
ﬁnancial wealth and human wealth. Equations (30) and (31) can be written in terms of gap variables.
The resulting four equations should now be included in a system like that shown in equations (14)—
(19), instead of equation (14).
To evaluate gains and losses we need a welfare metric. In the Blanchard-Yaari case, unlike in
the inﬁnitely-lived case, there is no obvious choice. Ideally total welfare should be evaluated using a
social welfare function that aggregates across generations and weights the utility of every generation.
It is not clear, however, how to treat future unborn generations. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) discuss
the importance of including unborn generation in the social welfare metric. If they are excluded,
we introduce an additional source of time-inconsistency, as the policy which treats some particular
generation diﬀerently will be necessarily time-inconsistent. However, straightforward aggregating of
the utilities of unborn generations is not feasible for computational reasons. One way to overcome
this diﬃculty is to suggest that the government uses a weighting scheme that makes the aggregate
welfare of overlapping generations equivalent to the welfare of one inﬁnitely long lived generation of
consumers. A similar strategy was also adopted by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988). We therefore use
formulae (21) to obtain our results.
13It is avalable at www.ex.ac.uk/~tkirsano.html and upon request from the authors.
145.2 Results
Figure 2 shows results when we set mortality to a realistic, non-zero value: p = 0.01 corresponds
to a working life of approximately 30 years. With Blanchard/Yaari consumers, the extent of ﬁscal
feedback by policymakers will now impact on consumers as well as government spending. However,
a number of the results noted above remain. We continue to obtain two determinate policy regimes.
With negligible ﬁscal feedback, optimal monetary policy is still passive, in the sense that interest rates
fall following a cost push shock. For λ ≥ λ∗ (using the same notation as above), monetary policy is
active, and this policy combination always dominates the negligible ﬁscal feedback regime in terms of
welfare. Once again, the optimum value of ﬁscal feedback (λ = λmin) is only slightly higher than the
minimum value in this active monetary policy area (λ = λ∗).
There are two diﬀerences introduced by Blanchard Yaari consumers. First, the range of λ over
which the model is indeterminate shifts slightly to the right. This means that a determinate passive
regime operates not just at λ = 0, but also for very small values of feedback just above zero (in
fact, up to λ = 0.0014). It also means that the ‘active’ regime starts at a value of λ just above
the value of λ∗ identiﬁed for inﬁnitely lived consumers. This is consistent with results in Leith and
Wren-Lewis (2000), where the critical value of λ derived from the determinate stability condition is
a positive function of p.14 The economic reason for this is as follows. A cost push shock raises debt,
and this has a positive impact on demand through consumption with Blanchard Yaari consumers. As
a result, monetary policy will generate a larger increase in interest rates, which in turn requires a
larger decrease in government spending to prevent a debt interest spiral. In fact, there is a natural
neutrality result here. The net impact of debt on demand combines the positive wealth eﬀect from
Blanchard—Yaari consumers with the negative eﬀect operating through ﬁscal feedback. It seems logical
that if the former increases (because of larger p), then optimal λ should rise in a corresponding way,
thereby neutralizing the overall impact of debt on demand.
We also compute the fully optimal ﬁscal policy when we have Blanchard Yaari consumers. Recall
that with inﬁnitely lived consumers, this policy implied a pure random walk for debt, a result that
is consistent with ﬁndings in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Benigno and Woodford (2004).
However, there has until now been no equivalent analysis in a model where consumers have ﬁnite lives
and there are no bequests. We ﬁnd that the random walk result does not hold in this case. The fully
14Our results go beyond those in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), who also consider Blanchard—Yaari consumers, in
three respects. First, we show for negligible ﬁscal feedback that the optimal monetary policy is still passive (it responds
negatively to inﬂation) even though it can also feedback directly from debt. Second, we show that the optimal monetary
policy is strongly passive: the negative feedback on the cost push shock and inﬂation is very large. (This result is hinted
at, but not established, in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).) Third, Figure 2 shows that this passive monetary policy, while
it stabilizes debt, has a clear welfare cost compared to the alternative regime with signiﬁcant ﬁscal feedback.
15optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy produce a system where one of the eigenvalues is very close to one,
but not equal to one. The reason for this is as follows. In a model with Blanchard Yaari consumers,
the steady state real interest rate is no longer always equal to the rate of time preference, but instead
is increasing in the steady state level of debt. A standard result from consumption smoothing is that
if the real rate of interest diﬀers from the rate of time preference we get ‘tilting’, and the same applies
in this case to the path of public consumption chosen when the policy maker optimises. This makes
a pure random walk outcome suboptimal. However, as Figure 4 shows, the behaviour of debt, both
for a fully optimal policy and for optimal ﬁscal feedback, are pretty close to a random walk, with less
than half of debt disequilibrium eliminated after 250 years.
6 Conclusion
We have examined the impact of diﬀerent degrees of ﬁscal feedback on debt in an economy with
nominal inertia where monetary policy is optimal. Consumers are either inﬁnitely lived, or of the
Blanchard Yaari type. Our focus is on the extent to which diﬀerent speeds of ﬁscal feedback on debt
enhance or detract from the ability of the monetary authorities to stabilise output and inﬂation.
Using a welfare function derived from utility, we ﬁnd the optimal level of ﬁscal feedback to be
small. With this optimal degree of ﬁscal feedback, the behaviour of debt is very close to a random
walk following shocks. Under a fully optimal ﬁscal policy, if consumers are inﬁnitely lived we ﬁnd that
debt behaves as an exact random walk, as found in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Benigno
and Woodford (2004). However, if consumers are of the Blanchard Yaari type, the fully optimal ﬁscal
policy is no longer an exact random walk, although it is close to it. We directly infer that optimal
monetary policy is active, both for fully optimal ﬁscal policy and for the optimal level of ﬁscal feedback.
In addition, we ﬁnd that the costs of restricting ﬁscal policy to only respond to debt disequilibrium
are small compared to a fully optimal ﬁscal policy.
There is a discontinuity in the behaviour of monetary policy and welfare either side of this optimal
level. As the extent of ﬁscal feedback increases beyond the optimal level, optimal monetary policy
becomes less active because ﬁscal feedback also tends to deﬂate inﬂationary shocks. However this ﬁscal
stabilisation is less eﬃcient than monetary policy, and so welfare declines. In contrast, if ﬁscal feedback
falls below the optimal level, either the economy becomes indeterminate, or optimal monetary policy
becomes strongly passive, with interest rates falling following a cost-push shock. In eﬀect the focus
of monetary policy becomes stabilising debt, because of insuﬃcient ﬁscal feedback. We get a policy
regime with similarities to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. We show that this passive monetary
policy leads to a sharp deterioration in welfare.
16Mortality rate p = 0.00 p = 0.01
Social Loss
Optimal policy 0.7495 0.7514
λ = 0.0 0.9579 0.9577
Simple ﬁscal λ = λ∗ 0.7500022 0.75210
λ = λmin 0.7500009 0.75205
feedback λ = 0.1 0.7676 0.7682
λ = 0.5 0.8350 0.8353
Monetary Feedback on Cost-Push Shock (θµ)
Optimal policy 2.1957 2.1257
λ = 0.0 -5.3782 -5.3762
Simple ﬁscal λ = λ∗ 2.2047 2.1316
λ = λmin 2.2048 2.1342
feedback λ = 0.1 1.6084 1.5871
λ = 0.5 0.1714 0.1658
Table 1: Welfare Loss and Activity of Monetary Policy


















































Figure 1: Feedback coeﬃcients of the monetary policy reaction function on the cost push shock and
debt, and the resulting value of loss as functions of the ﬁscal feedback coeﬃcient. The model with
inﬁnitely lived consumers.


















































Figure 2: Feedback coeﬃcients of the monetary policy reaction function on the cost push shock and
debt, and the resulting value of loss as functions of the ﬁscal feedback coeﬃcient. The model with
Blanchard-Yaari consumers.














































































Figure 3: Impulse responses to a cost push shock. The model with inﬁnitely lived consumers. The
solid line denotes responses for λ = λmin and the dashed line denots responses for λ = 0.
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Figure 4: Evolution of Debt and Government spending following a unit cost-push shock. Solid line —
optimal simple feedback ﬁscal policy (λmin), dashed line — fully optimal ﬁscal policy.
21A Optimisation, Eigenvalues and Stability
The linear diﬀerence system (22)-(28) is closed with a dynamic process for the exogenous shock ˆ µt,and
this makes it to be of eighth order. It should be solved subject to eight boundary conditions. We
require initial values for predetermined endogenous variables (debt in our case). Principle maximum
by Pontryagin requires setting zero initial conditions for those Lagrange multipliers which are asso-
ciated with dynamic constraints on non-predetermined variables (see e.g. Currie and Levine (1993)).
Appropriate transversality conditions close the system.
The system (22)-(28) plus one dynamic process for the shock has eight generalised eigenvalues. It
is possible to compute them analytically for two particular values of the ﬁscal feedback parameter λ.
For λ = 0 the generalised eigenvalues are (in accending order)
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Similarly, for λ = λ∗ =
B(1−β)(κc+ρκy)
(1−ρ)(κc(1−τ)+κyρ) the eigenvalues are
δ1 = δ2 = 0,
δ3 = solution of quadratic equation < 1,












We can also show numerically that for a relatively wide range of λ ≥ 0 the following holds:
￿δ7(λ)￿ = ￿δ8(λ)￿ = ∞, ￿δ1(λ)￿ = ￿δ2(λ)￿ = 0, ￿δ3(λ)￿ < 1,￿δ6(λ)￿ > 1
β .




















Figure 5: The structure of eigenvalues.
to δ4(λ∗) = 1 and δ5(λ) increases from δ5(0) = 1 to δ5(λ∗) = 1
β. For λ > λ∗, δ4(λ) < 1 and δ5(λ) >
1
β. This is shown schematically in Figure 5, where eigenvalues are plotted against the value of ﬁscal
feedback λ.
Large ﬁscal feedback (λ ≥ λ∗)
When λ > λ∗ we have four eigenvalues which are strictly less than one, and four explosive eigen-
values (which are strictly greater than 1
β). We thus obtain a unique solution. When t increases, all
economic variables, Bt,ct,πt, once disturbed, converge to their steady state values.
When λ = λ∗ then δ4 = 1 and δ5 = 1
β. The ﬁfth eigenvalue is classiﬁed as explosive (it is ruled
out by the transversality conditions.) The solution thus has unit-root dynamics of bt,gt and ct in
response to shocks.
Zero feedback (λ = 0)
Suppose λ = 0. We now have δ4 = 1
β, δ5 = 1. We take δ4 as an explosive eigenvalue. Note that in
this case neither of the economic variables bt,ct,πt or instrument it will exhibit unit-root behaviour.
23Lagrange multipliers have unit root dynamics instead.
Positive but small feedback (0 < λ < λ∗)
For the intermediate range of parameter λ, 0 < λ < λ∗, there are ﬁve eigenvalues that are less
than 1
β. We have a continuum of solutions that satisfy transversality conditions and initial conditions.
Under any of these continuum of solutions, the model exhibits explosive behaviour. However, this
explosive behaviour is modest, as variables will grow at a rate that is slower than the steady state rate
of interest (1
β). The implied loss is ﬁnite.
B Optimal solution in a form of feedback rule
It is informative to write down the optimal solution in the form of a feedback rule. System (22)-(28)
is a linear system of ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations which can be written in the following matrix form:











￿ is vector of variables, and we have initial condi-
tions for z1t. Matrices Γ0 and Γ1 can be singular. Having decided which n2 eigenvalues are declared as
explosive, we can partition our variables correspondingly, where zs = (z1,s,z2,s)￿. The canonical form
(32) can be transformed through a generalised Schur decomposition (QZ) of Γ0 and Γ1 (see e.g. Klein
(2000)). There exist matrices Q,Z,S and T such that Q￿SZ￿ = Γ0,Q￿TZ￿ = Γ1,QQ￿ = ZZ￿ = I, and
S and T are upper-triangular. The QZ decomposition always exists. We can transform equation (32)

























The generalised eigenvalues are deﬁned as δi = tii/sii. By re-ordering their columns and rows we
can achieve any order of generalised eigenvalues along the main diagonals of S and T.
Suppose the partitioning is such that all generalised eigenvalues of the second bloc δi should not
aﬀect the solution (they are either explosive, ￿δi￿ > 1
β, or they are ruled out by our selection procedure,
for 0 ≤ λ < λ∗). Then we have to assume that w2,0 are zero (and thus w2,t ≡ 0, for any t). This leads
24to the following expression for the remaining variables (S−1
11 is now invertible as it is upper triangular
and does not contain zeros along the main diagonal):
w1,t = S−1
11 T11w1,t−1
































Note that z2 contains the interest rate, so from z2,t = Nz1,t−1 it follows that we can write the optimal
reaction function as the feedback rule (29) in the main text, where Lπ
t ,Lc
t are Lagrange multipliers,
associated with constraints on inﬂation and consumption. Lagrange multiplies themselves can be
presented as discounted linear combination of past values of π and c. Thus, all right hand side variables
in (29) are predetermined (see Currie and Levine (1993)). This representation of the optimal policy is
useful in judging whether policy is active or passive: we can look at the sign (and size) of θ—coeﬃcients,
as they will determine the reaction of the interest rate to shocks in the short run. ϑ—coeﬃcients are
set on predetermined Lagrange multipliers, which move relatively slowly in the short run, as they are
integrals of past variables.
C Calibration
Given the microfounded nature of the model, there are relatively few parameters to calibrate. One
period is taken as equal to one quarter of a year. All behavioural parameters below are taken from
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
assumed parameters assumed parameters




















As discussed in Appendix D.2, formulae (39) and (37), we assume a subsidy that eliminates the







= 1. Our calibration ρ = 0.75 implies
ζ = 1/9.
25D Steady State and Welfare
D.1 Government expenditures in steady state
The aggregate demand relationship (12) always holds along the dynamic path of the economy, which































We assume that the steady state level of government expenditures is chosen to maximise the utility




(u(Cs) + f(G) − v(Ys)) = uC(C)
∂C
∂G
















ψ(1 − τ)µw/µ + ρσ
(ψ + ρσ)
(36)

























15Derivatives of constraints are equal to zero so we did not include them in the ﬁnal expression.
26D.2 Derivation of the Social Welfare Function
The derivation of the welfare metric is standard and for this model it is explained in detail in Kirsanova,
Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2006). The one-period (ﬂow) welfare in (20) is Wt :
















































where we assumed σ = −uC/uCCC = −fG/fGGG, ψ = −vy/vyyY.
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To transform this equation into a more convenient form that does not include linear terms, we
proceed as follows (see Beetsma and Jensen (2004b)). We have derived relationship (36) for fG/uC
in the steady state. If the government removes monopolistic distortions and distortions from income







































(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
π2
t




2ψ(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
uC
￿



















which is formula (21) in the main text.
References
B￿￿￿￿￿￿, R., ￿￿￿ H. J￿￿￿￿￿ (2004a): “Mark-up Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy Stabilization in a
Monetary Union,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 26, 357—376.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿, R., ￿￿￿ H. J￿￿￿￿￿ (2004b): “Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a Micro-founded
Model of a Monetary Union,” Journal of International Economics, Forthcoming.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿, P., ￿￿￿ M. W￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2004): “Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Linear-Quadratic
Approach,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, pp. 271—333.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, O. (1985): “Debt, Deﬁcits, and Finite Horizons,” Journal of Political Economy, 93(2),
223—247.
B￿￿￿￿￿, W. (2002): “The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: A Critique,” Economic Journal, 112,
459—480.
C￿￿￿￿, G., ￿￿￿ M. O￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1988): “Optimal Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy with Finite Life-
times,” Econometrica, 56(2), 411—432.
C￿￿￿￿￿, D., ￿￿￿ P. L￿￿￿￿￿ (1993): Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
D￿!￿￿, A., ￿￿￿ J. S￿￿￿￿￿￿$ (1977): “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum product Diversity,”
American Economic Review, 67, 297—308.
G￿￿￿￿￿￿, G. (2005): “The new open economy macroeconomics of government debt,” Journal of
International Economics, 65, 167—184.
K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, T., C. L￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ S. W￿￿￿-L￿(￿￿ (2006): “Should Central Banks target Consumer
Prices or the Exchange Rate?,” Economic Journal, 116, 208—231.
28K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, T., M. S￿￿￿￿￿, D. V￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ S. W￿￿￿-L￿(￿￿ (2007): “Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules
in a Monetary Union,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Forthcoming.
K￿￿￿￿, P. (2000): “Using the Generalized Schur Form to Solve a Multivariate Linear Rational Ex-
pectations Model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24(10), 1405—1423.
L￿￿*￿￿, E. (1991): “Equilibria Under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Monetary and Fiscal Policies,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 27, 129—147.
L￿￿￿￿, C., ￿￿￿ S. W￿￿￿-L￿(￿￿ (2000): “Interactions Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules,”
The Economic Journal, 110, C93—C108.
(2006): “Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian model,” mimeo, University of Glasgow.
(2007): “Compatability Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Under EMU,” European Eco-
nomic Review, Forthcoming.
R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, J. J., ￿￿￿ M. W￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1997): “An Optimization-based Econometric Framework
for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 297—344.
S￿￿￿￿￿￿-G￿￿￿￿, S., ￿￿￿ M. U￿￿￿￿ (2004): “Optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy under sticky
prices,” Journal of Economic Theory, 114, 198—230.
S￿￿￿￿, F., ￿￿￿ R. W￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2002): “Openness, Imperfect Exchange Rate Pass-Through and
Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 49.
S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, A. (2002): “A Simple Second-Order Solution Method For Dynamic General Equilib-
rium Models,” CEPR discussion paper 3554.
W￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, M. (1996): “Control of the Public Debt: A Requirement for Price Stability?,” Working
Paper 5684, NBER.
(2003): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, NJ.
29www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma 
ABOUT THE CDMA 
 
  The Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis was established by a direct 
grant from the University of St Andrews in 2003. The Centre funds PhD students and 
facilitates a programme of research centred on macroeconomic theory and policy. The 
Centre has research interests in areas such as: characterising the key stylised facts of 
the business cycle; constructing theoretical models that can match these business 
cycles; using theoretical models to understand the normative and positive aspects of 
the macroeconomic policymakers' stabilisation problem, in both open and closed 
economies; understanding the conduct of monetary/macroeconomic policy in the UK 
and other countries; analyzing the impact of globalization and policy reform on the 
macroeconomy; and analyzing the impact of financial factors on the long-run growth 
of the UK economy, from both an historical and a theoretical perspective. The Centre 
also has interests in developing numerical techniques for analyzing dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models. Its affiliated members are Faculty members at St Andrews 
and elsewhere with interests in the broad area of dynamic macroeconomics. Its 
international Advisory Board comprises a group of leading macroeconomists and, ex 
officio, the University's Principal. 
 
 
Affiliated Members of the School 
Dr Arnab Bhattacharjee. 
Dr Tatiana Damjanovic. 
Dr Vladislav Damjanovic.  
Dr Laurence Lasselle.  
Dr Peter Macmillan. 
Prof Kaushik Mitra. 
Prof Charles Nolan (Director). 
Dr Gary Shea.  
Prof Alan Sutherland.  
Dr Christoph Thoenissen.  
 
Senior Research Fellow 
Prof Andrew Hughes Hallett, Professor of 
Economics, Vanderbilt University.  
 
Research Affiliates 
Prof Keith Blackburn, Manchester University.  
Prof David Cobham, Heriot-Watt University. 
Dr Luisa Corrado, Università degli Studi di Roma.  
Prof Huw Dixon, York University. 
Dr Anthony Garratt, Birkbeck College London. 
Dr Sugata Ghosh, Brunel University.  
Dr Aditya Goenka, Essex University.  
Dr Campbell Leith, Glasgow University.  
Dr Richard Mash, New College, Oxford.  
Prof Patrick Minford, Cardiff Business School.  
Dr Gulcin Ozkan, York University.  
Prof Joe Pearlman, London Metropolitan 
University.  
Prof Neil Rankin, Warwick University.  
Prof Lucio Sarno, Warwick University.  
Prof Eric Schaling, Rand Afrikaans University.  
Prof Peter N. Smith, York University. 
Dr Frank Smets, European Central Bank.  
Dr Robert Sollis, Durham University.  
Dr Peter Tinsley, George Washington University 
and Federal Reserve Board.  
Dr Mark Weder, University of Adelaide.  
 
Research Associates 
Mr Nikola Bokan.  
Mr Michal Horvath.  
Ms Elisa Newby.  
Mr Qi Sun.  
Mr Alex Trew.  
 
Advisory Board 
Prof Sumru Altug, Koç University.  
Prof V V Chari, Minnesota University.  
Prof John Driffill, Birkbeck College London.  
Dr Sean Holly, Director of the Department of 
Applied Economics, Cambridge University.  
Prof Seppo Honkapohja, Cambridge University.  
Dr Brian Lang, Principal of St Andrews University.  
Prof Anton Muscatelli, Glasgow University.  
Prof Charles Nolan, St Andrews University.  
Prof Peter Sinclair, Birmingham University and 
Bank of England.  
Prof Stephen J Turnovsky, Washington University.  
Mr Martin Weale, CBE, Director of the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research.  
Prof Michael Wickens, York University.  
Prof Simon Wren-Lewis, Exeter University.  
 www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma 
 
THE CDMA CONFERENCE 2006, held in St. Andrews, 6th to the 8th of September 2006. 
 
PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE, IN ORDER OF PRESENTATION: 
 
  Title  Author(s) (presenter(s) in bold) 
 
  Understanding the Macroeconomics of Oil  Peter Sinclair (Birminham) 
    
  Caution of Activism? Monetary Policy 
Strategies in an Open Economy 
Martin Ellison (Warwick and CEPR), Lucio 
Sarno (Warwick BS and CEPR) and Juoko 
Vilmunen (Bank of Finland) 
    
  Interest Rate Smoothing and Monetary Policy 
Activism in the Bank of England, the ECB 
and the Fed 
David Cobham (Heriot-Watt) 
    
  Linear-Quadratic Approximation, Efficiency 
and Target-Implementability 
Paul Levine (Surrey), Joseph Pearlman (London 
Metropolitan) and Richard Pierse (Surrey) 
    
  The Relationship between Output and 
Unemployment with Efficiency Wages 
Jim Malley (Glasgow) and Hassan Molana 
(Dundee) 
    
  Understanding Labour Market FrictionsL A 
Tobin’s Q Approach 
Parantap Basu (Durham) 
    
  Money Velocity in an Endogenous Growth 
Business Cycle with Credit Shocks 
Szilárd Benk (Magyar Nemzeti Bank and Central 
European University), Max Gillman (Cardiff 
and Hungarian Academy of Sciences) and 
Michal Kejak (CERGE-EI) 
    
  Partial Contracts  Oliver Hart (Harvard) and John Hardman 
Moore (Edinburgh and LSE)  
    
  Optimal Fiscal Feedbak on Debt in an 
Economy with Nominal Rigidities 
Tatiana Kirsanova (Exeter) and Simon Wren-
Lewis (Exeter) 
    
  Inflation Targeting: Is the NKM fit for 
purpose? 
Peter N. Smith (York) and Mike Wickens (York)
    
  Testing a Simple Structural Model of 
Endogenous Growth 
Patrick Minford (Cardiff and CEPR), David 
Meenagh (Cardiff) and Jiang Wang (Cardiff) 
    
  The Optimal Monetary Policy Response to 
Exchange Rate Misalignments 
Cambell Leith (Glasgow) and Simon Wren-
Lewis (Exeter) 
    
  Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-
Unemployment Dynamics 
Andy Snell (Edinburgh) and Jonathan Thomas 
(Edinburgh) 
 
See also the CDMA Working Paper series at www.st-andrews.ac.uk/cdma/papers.html. 
 